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sanction violators of legal rules.  We first discuss the basic 
elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, 
the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and 
the rule of liability.  We then examine a variety of extensions, 
including the costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal 
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- 1 - In this entry we consider the theory of public enforcement of law — the use of public 
agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal 
rules.  After briefly discussing the rationale for public (as opposed to private) enforcement, we 
present the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the 
magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability.  We then 
examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including the costs of imposing fines, 
mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, and incapacitation.  (For 
a fuller treatment of the material in this entry, see Polinsky and Shavell, 2007.) 
  Before proceeding, we note that economically-oriented analysis of public law 
enforcement dates primarily from the eighteenth century contribution of Bentham (1789), whose 
analysis of deterrence was sophisticated and expansive.  After Bentham, the subject of 
enforcement lay essentially dormant in economic scholarship until Gary Becker (1968) 
published a highly influential article, which has led to a voluminous literature. 
 
RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT.  A basic question is why there is a need 
for public enforcement of law (see generally Becker and Stigler, 1974; Landes and Posner, 1975; 
Polinsky, 1980a).  In particular, why not rely solely on private suits brought by victims?  The 
answer depends importantly on the locus of information about the identity of injurers.  When 
victims of harm naturally possess knowledge of the identity of injurers, allowing private suits for 
damages will motivate victims to sue and thus harness the information they have for purposes of 
law enforcement.  This may explain why the enforcement of contractual obligations and of 
accident law is primarily private.  When victims do not know who caused harm, however, or 
when finding injurers is difficult, society may need to rely instead on public investigation and 
 
- 2 - prosecution; this is broadly true of crimes and of many violations of environmental and safety 
regulations.   
 
  BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT.  An individual 
who commits a harmful act obtains a gain and also faces the risk of being caught and sanctioned. 
 The form of sanction could be a fine or a prison term.  Fines generally will be treated as socially 
costless because they are mere transfers of money, whereas imprisonment will be considered as 
socially costly because of the expense of operating prisons and the disutility suffered by those 
imprisoned.  The higher is the probability of detecting violators, the more resources the state 
must devote to enforcement.  
We assume that social welfare equals the sum of individuals’ expected utilities.  If 
individuals are risk neutral, social welfare can be expressed as the gains individuals obtain from 
committing their harmful acts, less the harms caused, and less the costs of law enforcement.  The 
enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social welfare by choosing enforcement 
expenditures (or, equivalently, a probability of detection), the form of sanctions, and their level. 
 
FINES.  Suppose that the sanction is a fine and that individuals are risk neutral.  If the 
probability of detection p is taken as fixed, then the optimal fine is the harm h divided by the 
probability, that is, h/p; for then the expected fine p(h/p) equals h.  This fine is optimal because, 
facing it, an individual will commit a harmful act if, and only if, the gain he would derive 
exceeds the harm he would cause.  Such behavior is first-best.  The fundamental formula h/p 
essentially was noted by Bentham (1789) and it has been observed by many others since. 
If the probability of detection can be varied, the optimal fine is maximal, fM, as 
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costs by simultaneously raising the fine and lowering the probability without affecting the level 
of deterrence.  If f < fM, then raise the fine to fM and lower the probability from p to (f/fM)p; the 
expected fine is still pf, so that deterrence is maintained, but expenditures on enforcement are 
reduced, implying that social welfare rises.  
The optimal probability p of imposing a fine is low in the sense that it results in some 
underdeterrence; that is, the optimal p is such that the expected fine pfM is less than the harm h 
(Polinsky and Shavell, 1984).  The reason is to economize on enforcement resources.  In 
particular, if pfM equals h, behavior will be ideal, meaning that the individuals who are just 
deterred obtain gains essentially equal to the harm.  These are the individuals who would be led 
to commit the harmful act if p were lowered slightly.  That in turn must be socially beneficial 
because these individuals cause no net social losses (their gains essentially equal the harm), but 
reducing p saves enforcement costs.  How much pfM should be lowered below h depends on the 
saving in enforcement costs from reducing p compared to the net social costs of underdeterrence 
that will result if p is lowered non-trivially. 
If individuals are risk averse, the optimal fine may be well below the maximal fine, as 
first shown in Polinsky and Shavell (1979); see also Kaplow (1992).  This is because a high fine 
would impose substantial risk-bearing costs on individuals who commit harmful acts.  If f < fM, it 
is still true that f can be raised and p lowered so as to maintain deterrence, but because of risk 
aversion, this now implies that pf falls, meaning that fine revenue falls.  The reduction in fine 
revenue reflects the disutility caused by imposing greater risk on risk-averse individuals.  The 
decline in fine revenue could more than offset the savings in enforcement expenditures, causing 
social welfare to be lower. 
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  IMPRISONMENT.  Now suppose that the sanction is imprisonment.  If the probability of 
detection is fixed, there is not a simple formula for the optimal imprisonment term; see Polinsky 
and Shavell (1984).  The optimal term could be such that there is either underdeterrence or 
overdeterrence.  On one hand, a relatively low imprisonment term, implying underdeterrence, 
might be socially desirable because imprisonment costs are reduced for those individuals who 
commit harmful acts.  On the other hand, a relatively high term, implying overdeterrence, might 
be socially desirable because imprisonment costs are reduced due to fewer individuals 
committing harmful acts, even if some of these deterred individuals would have obtained gains 
exceeding the harm. 
  If the probability of detection can be varied and individuals are risk neutral in 
imprisonment, then the optimal imprisonment term is maximal.  The reasoning is similar to that 
employed above: if the imprisonment term were not maximal, it could be raised and the 
probability of detection lowered so as to keep the expected prison term constant; neither 
individual behavior nor the costs of imprisonment are affected, but enforcement expenditures 
fall.  
  If, instead, individuals are risk averse in imprisonment (the disutility of each additional 
year of imprisonment grows with the number of years in prison), there is a stronger argument for 
setting the imprisonment sanction maximally (Polinsky and Shavell, 1999).  Now when the 
imprisonment term is raised, the probability of detection can be lowered more than in the risk-
neutral case without reducing deterrence.  Thus, not only are there greater savings in 
enforcement expenditures, but also the costs of imposing imprisonment sanctions decline 
because the expected prison term falls.   
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additional year of imprisonment declines with the number of years in prison).  This possibility 
seems particularly important: the first years of imprisonment may create unusually high 
disutility, due to brutalization of the prisoner or to the stigma of having been imprisoned at all.  
Individuals’ positive time discount rates, which are thought to be especially significant for 
criminals, also make the disutility of later years less significant.  In the case of risk-preferring 
individuals, the optimal prison term may well be less than maximal: if the sentence were raised, 
the probability that maintains deterrence could not be lowered proportionally, implying that the 
expected prison term would rise.  Thus, although there would be enforcement cost savings, they 
might not be great enough to offset the increased sanctioning costs. 
  When the sanction is imprisonment, the optimal probability of detection may be such that 
there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence.  On one hand, the motive to lower the 
probability is reinforced relative to the case of fines because imprisonment costs, as well as 
detection costs, decline if fewer offenders are caught.  On the other hand, raising the probability 
of detection results in fewer offenders, which, everything else equal, decreases imprisonment 
costs because fewer are imprisoned.  Either effect may dominate. 
 
FINES VERSUS IMPRISONMENT.  Fines generally are preferable to prison terms as a 
means of deterrence, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions to impose (Becker, 1968; 
Polinsky and Shavell, 1984).  Hence, fines should be employed to the greatest extent possible —
 until a party’s wealth is exhausted — before imprisonment is imposed.  Further, imprisonment 
should be used as a sanction only if the harm prevented by the added deterrence is sufficiently 
great. 
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FAULT-BASED LIABILITY.  Our discussion thus far has presumed that liability is 
strict — is imposed whenever harm occurs — but liability may instead be based on fault —
 imposed only when behavior was found to be socially undesirable.  Fault-based liability, like 
strict liability, can induce individuals to behave properly, but fault-based liability possesses an 
advantage when individuals are risk averse: if they act responsibly, they will not be found at 
fault, so will not bear the risk of being sanctioned.  Similarly, fault-based liability is 
advantageous when the sanction is imprisonment, for then again individuals may be led to 
behave optimally without the actual imposition of sanctions, and thus without social costs being 
incurred (Shavell, 1987b).  To the extent that mistakes are made in determining fault, however, 
these two advantages are reduced. 
Fault-based liability is more difficult to implement because it requires more information 
than strict liability.  To apply fault-based liability, the enforcement authority must be able to 
determine the proper fault standard — that is, socially desirable behavior — and it must ascertain 
whether the defendant’s conduct was in compliance with the fault standard.  Under strict 
liability, the authority need only measure harm.  (Moreover, for reasons we discuss below, strict 
liability encourages better decisions by injurers regarding their level of participation in harm-
creating activities.) 
  *  *  * 
This concludes the presentation of the basic theory of public enforcement of law.  We 
now turn to various extensions and refinements of the analysis. 
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whether or not to commit acts that cause harm with certainty, that is, they decide whether or not 
to cause intentional harms.  In many circumstances, however, harms are accidental — they occur 
only with a probability.  Essentially all that we have said above applies in a straightforward way 
when harms are accidental. 
There is, however, an additional issue that arises when harm is uncertain: a sanction can 
be imposed either on the basis of the commission of an act that increases the chance of harm — 
storing chemicals in a substandard tank — or on the basis of the actual occurrence of harm — if 
the tank ruptures and results in a spill.  In principle, either approach can achieve optimal 
deterrence — by setting the (expected) sanction equal to expected harm if liability is imposed 
whenever a dangerous act is committed, or equal to actual harm if liability is imposed only if 
harm occurs. 
Several factors are relevant to the choice between act-based and harm-based sanctions 
(Shavell, 1993).  First, act-based sanctions need not be as high as harm-based sanctions to 
accomplish a given level of deterrence (expected harm is less than actual harm), and thus offer 
an advantage because of parties’ limited assets.  Second, because act-based sanctions can 
accomplish a given level of deterrence with lower sanctions, they are preferable when parties are 
risk averse.  Third, either act-based sanctions may be simpler to impose (it might be less difficult 
to determine whether an oil shipper properly maintains its vessels’ holding tanks than to detect 
whether one of the vessels leaked oil), or harm-based sanctions may be easier to implement (a 
driver who causes harm might be caught without difficulty, but not one who speeds).  Fourth, it 
may be hard to calculate the expected harm due to an act, but relatively easy to ascertain the 
actual harm if it eventuates, favoring harm-based sanctions. 
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COSTS OF IMPOSING FINES.  The costs borne by enforcement authorities in imposing 
fines should be reflected in the fine.  Recall that if the probability of detection is taken as fixed 
and individuals are risk neutral, the optimal fine is h/p, the harm divided by the probability of 
detection.  Now suppose there is a public cost k of imposing a fine.  The optimal fine then 
becomes h/p + k; the cost k should be added to the fine that would otherwise be desirable 
(Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 1992).  The explanation is that, if an individual commits a 
harmful act, he causes society to bear not only the immediate harm h, but also, with probability 
p, the cost k of imposing the fine — that is, his act results in an expected total social cost of h + 
pk.  If the fine is h/p + k, the individual’s expected fine is  p[h/p + k] = h + pk, leading him to 
commit the harmful act if and only if his gain exceeds the expected total social cost of his act.   
Not only does the state bear costs when fines are imposed, so do individuals who pay the 
fines (such as legal defense expenses).  The costs borne by individuals, however, do not affect 
the formula for the optimal fine.  Individuals properly take these costs into account, because they 
bear them. 
 
LEVEL OF ACTIVITY.  In many settings in which harm may occur, an individual not 
only chooses whether to commit a harmful act when engaging in an activity, but also the level at 
which to engage in the activity.  Drivers decide how careful to be while driving, as well as how 
many miles to drive; similarly, firms choose safety precautions as well as their level of output.  
The socially optimal activity level is such that the actor’s marginal utility from the activity just 
equals the marginal expected harm caused by the activity (assuming optimal care is taken).  
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extra mile just equals the marginal expected harm per mile driven.   
Under strict liability, parties will choose the optimal level of activity because they will 
pay for all harm done.  They will choose the optimal number of miles to drive because they will 
pay for all harm per mile driven.  Under fault-based liability, however, parties generally do not 
pay for the harm they cause because they tend to behave so as not to be found at fault.  As a 
consequence, they will choose an excessive level of activity (Shavell, 1980).  Driving more 
miles increases expected harm, but this effect generally will be ignored under fault-based 
liability. 
The interpretation of the preceding points in relation to firms is that under strict liability, 
the product price will reflect the expected harm caused by production.  Hence, the amount 
purchased, and thus the level of production, will tend to be socially optimal.  However, under 
fault-based liability, the product price will not reflect harm, but only the cost of precautions; 
thus, the level of output will be excessive (Polinsky, 1980b). 
Relatedly, safety regulations and other regulatory requirements are often framed as 
standards of care that have to be met, but which, if met, free the regulated party from liability.  
Hence, regulations of this sort are subject to the criticism that they lead to excessive levels of the 
regulated activity.  Making parties strictly liable for harm would be superior to safety regulation 
with respect to inducing socially correct activity levels.  
 
MISTAKES.  An individual who should be found liable might mistakenly be acquitted.  
Conversely, an individual who should not be found liable might mistakenly be convicted.  For an 
individual who has been detected, let the probabilities of these errors be εA and εC, respectively.  
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commit the wrongful act if and only if his gain g net of his expected fine if he does commit it 
exceeds his expected fine if he does not commit it, namely, when g – p(1 – εA)f  > –pεCf, or, 
equivalently, when g > (1 – εA – εC)pf. 
As emphasized by Png (1986), both types of error reduce deterrence: the term (1 – εA – 
εC)pf is declining in both εA and εC.  The first type of error diminishes deterrence because it 
lowers the expected fine if an individual violates the law.  The second type of error lowers 
deterrence because it reduces the difference between the expected fine from violating the law 
and not violating it — the greater is εC, the smaller the increase in the expected fine if one 
violates the law. 
Because mistakes dilute deterrence, they reduce social welfare.  Specifically, to achieve 
any level of deterrence, the probability p must be higher to offset the effect of errors.  Mistaken 
convictions have the additional effect of discouraging socially desirable participation in the 
activity.  Consequently, expenditures made to reduce errors may be socially beneficial (Kaplow 
and Shavell, 1994a). 
Two other points regarding the implications of mistake are worth noting.  First, if 
individuals are risk averse, the possibility of mistakes of either type generally lowers optimal 
sanctions (Block and Sidak, 1980).  Second, as stressed by Craswell and Calfee (1986), 
individuals will often have a motive to take excessive precautions under fault-based liability in 
order to reduce the chance of being found erroneously at fault. 
 
GENERAL ENFORCEMENT.  In many settings, enforcement may be said to be general 
in the sense that several different types of violations will be detected by an enforcement agent’s 
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well as one who goes through a red light or who speeds, and a tax auditor may detect a variety of 
infractions when he examines a tax return.  (In contrast, if enforcement is specific, the 
probability is chosen independently for each type of harmful act.) 
When enforcement is general, the optimal sanction rises with the level of harm and is 
maximal only for relatively high harms (Shavell, 1991; Mookherjee and Png, 1992).  To see 
why, assume that liability is strict, the sanction is a fine, and injurers are risk neutral.  Let f(h) be 
the fine given harm h.  Then, for any general probability of detection p (that is, p applies 
regardless of h), the optimal fine schedule is h/p, provided that h/p is feasible; otherwise  the 
optimal fine is maximal.  This schedule is obviously optimal given p because it implies that the 
expected fine equals harm, thereby inducing ideal behavior whenever that is possible.  That 
sanctions should rise with the severity of harm up to a maximum when enforcement is general 
also holds if the sanction is imprisonment and if liability is fault-based. 
 
MARGINAL DETERRENCE.  In many circumstances, a person may consider which of 
several harmful acts to commit, for example, whether to release only a small amount of a 
pollutant into a river or a large amount, or whether to kidnap a person or also to kill the kidnap 
victim.  In such contexts, sanctions influence which harmful acts individuals choose to commit 
(as well as whether to commit any harmful act).  Marginal deterrence is said to occur when a 
more harmful act is deterred because its sanction exceeds that for a less harmful act (Stigler, 
1970; Shavell, 1992; Wilde, 1992; Mookherjee and Png, 1994). 
Other things being equal, it is socially desirable that enforcement policy creates marginal 
deterrence so that, when harmful acts do occur, less harm is done.  One way to accomplish 
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sanctions generally will not be maximal.  However, fostering marginal deterrence may conflict 
with achieving overall deterrence: in order for the schedule of sanctions to rise steeply enough to 
accomplish marginal deterrence, sanctions for less harmful acts may have to be so low that 
individuals are not deterred from committing some harmful act. 
Note that marginal deterrence also can be promoted by increasing the probability of 
detection.  Kidnappers can be better deterred from killing their victims if more police resources 
are devoted to apprehending kidnappers who murder their victims than to those who do not. 
 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP.  Although we have assumed that an injurer is a 
single actor, injurers often are more appropriately characterized as collective entities, and 
specifically as a principal and the principal’s agent.  For example, the principal could be a firm 
and the agent an employee; or the principal could be a contractor and the agent a subcontractor. 
When harm is caused by the behavior of principals and agents, many of our prior 
conclusions carry over to the sanctioning of principals.  Notably, if a risk-neutral principal faces 
an expected fine equal to harm done, he will behave socially optimally in controlling his agents, 
and in particular will contract with them and monitor them in ways that will give the agents 
appropriate incentives to reduce harm (Newman and Wright, 1990; but see Arlen, 1994). 
An issue that arises when there are principals and agents concerns the allocation of 
financial sanctions between the two parties.  It is apparent that the particular allocation of 
sanctions does not matter when the parties can reallocate the sanctions through their own 
contract.  For example, if the agent finds that he faces a large fine but is more risk averse than 
the principal, the principal can assume it; conversely, if the fine is imposed on the principal, he 
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that the agent bears are not affected by the particular division of sanctions initially selected by 
the enforcement authority.   
The allocation of monetary sanctions between principals and agents would matter, 
however, if some allocations allow the pair to reduce their total burden.  An important example 
is when a fine is imposed only on the agent and he is unable to pay it (Sykes, 1981; Kornhauser, 
1982).  Then, he and the principal (who often would have higher assets) would jointly escape 
part of the fine, diluting deterrence.  The fine therefore should be imposed on the principal rather 
than on the agent (or at least the part of the fine that the agent cannot pay). 
A closely related point is that the imposition of imprisonment sanctions on agents may be 
desirable when their assets are less than the harm that they can cause, even if the principal’s 
assets are sufficient to pay the optimal fine (Polinsky and Shavell, 1993).  That an agent’s assets 
are limited means that the principal may be unable to control him adequately through the use of 
contractually-determined penalties, which can only be monetary.  In such circumstances, it may 
be socially valuable to use the threat of a jail sentence to better control agents’ misconduct. 
 
SETTLEMENTS.  It is common for lawbreakers to settle with public enforcement 
authorities prior to being found liable in a trial.  (In the criminal context, the settlement usually 
takes the form of a plea bargain, an agreement in which the injurer pleads guilty to a reduced 
charge.)   Both parties might prefer an out-of-court settlement to avoid the cost of a trial and to 
eliminate the risks inherent in the trial outcome (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; and on plea 
bargaining, see Reinganum, 1988, and Miceli, 1996). 
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on deterrence is a complicating factor.  Specifically, settlements dilute deterrence: for if injurers 
desire to settle, it must be because the expected disutility of sanctions is lowered for them 
(Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1988).  The state may be able to offset this effect by increasing the 
level of sanctions. 
Settlements may have other socially undesirable consequences.  First, they may result in 
sanctions that are not as well tailored to harmful acts as would be true of court-determined 
sanctions.  For example, if injurers have private information about the harm that they have 
caused, settlements will tend to reflect the average harm caused (resulting in high-harm injurers 
being underdeterred, and vice versa), whereas trial outcomes may better approximate the actual 
harm.  Second, settlements hinder the amplification and development of the law through the 
setting of precedents.  Third, if the sanction is imprisonment and defendants are risk averse, 
settlements necessitate longer terms than the expected sentence at trial in order to maintain 
deterrence, and thus increase public expenditures.  On the social welfare evaluation of 
settlement, see, for example, Shavell (1997) and Spier (1997). 
 
SELF-REPORTING.  We have assumed that individuals are subject to sanctions only if 
they are detected by an enforcement agent, but in fact parties sometimes disclose their own 
violations.  For example, firms often report infractions of environmental and safety regulations, 
individuals usually notify police of their involvement in traffic accidents, and even criminals 
occasionally turn themselves in. 
Self-reporting can be induced by lowering the sanction for individuals who disclose their 
own violations (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994b).  Moreover, the reward for self-reporting can be 
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individual commits a violation and does not self report, his expected fine is pf.  If he self-reports, 
the fine can be set just below pf, say at pf - ε, where ε > 0 is small.  Then the  individual will 
want to self-report but the deterrent effect of the sanction will be essentially the same as if he did 
not self-report. 
There are several advantages of self-reporting.  First, self-reporting reduces enforcement 
costs because the enforcement authority does not have to identify and prove who the violator 
was.  Second, self-reporting reduces risk (a relatively high sanction imposed with a relatively 
low probability is replaced by a certain punishment), and thus is advantageous if injurers are risk 
averse.  Third, self-reporting may allow harm to be mitigated (early notice of an oil spill may 
facilitate its containment). 
 
REPEAT OFFENDERS.  In practice, the law often sanctions repeat offenders more 
severely than first-time offenders.  This policy cannot be socially advantageous if deterrence 
always induces first-best behavior.  For if the expected sanction for an offense equals its harm, 
then raising the sanction because an offender has a record of sanctions would overdeter him.  
Only if deterrence is inadequate is it possibly desirable to condition sanctions on offense history 
to increase deterrence.  But as we observed above, it usually will be worthwhile for the state to 
tolerate some underdeterrence in order to reduce enforcement expenses. 
If there is underdeterrence, making sanctions depend on offense history may be 
beneficial.  First, the use of offense history may create an additional incentive not to violate the 
law: if getting caught implies not only an immediate sanction, but also a higher sanction for any 
future violation, an individual will, everything else equal, be deterred to a greater extent 
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society to take advantage of information about the dangerousness of individuals and the need to 
deter them: individuals with offense histories may be more likely than average to commit future 
violations, which might make it desirable to impose higher sanctions on them (Rubinstein, 1979; 
Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1991).  In addition, if repeat offenders have higher propensities to 
commit violations, they are more likely to be worth incapacitating by imprisonment (see below). 
 
IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITY AND MAGNITUDE OF 
SANCTIONS.  Individuals might not know the true probability of a sanction because the 
enforcement authority refrains from publishing information about the probability (perhaps 
hoping that individuals will believe it to be higher than it is in fact); or because the probability 
depends on factors that individuals do not fully understand; or because probabilities are difficult 
to assess.  Also, individuals may have incomplete knowledge of the true magnitude of sanctions, 
particularly if the levels of sanctions are discretionary. 
The implications of injurers’ imperfect knowledge are straightforward.  First, to predict 
how individuals behave, what is relevant, of course, is not the actual probability and magnitude 
of a sanction, but the perceived levels or distributions of these variables.  Second, to determine 
the optimal probability and magnitude of a sanction, account must be taken of the relationship 
between the actual and the perceived variables (Bebchuk and Kaplow, 1992; Kaplow, 1990).  
For example, if enforcement resources are increased in order to raise the probability of detection, 
there might be a delay before this increase is perceived by individuals, making such an 
investment less worthwhile. 
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imposing sanctions that remove parties from positions in which they are able to cause harm, that 
is, by incapacitating them.  Imprisonment is the primary incapacitative sanction, although there 
are other examples: individuals can lose their drivers’ licenses, businesses can lose their rights to 
operate in certain markets, and the like. 
Suppose that the sole function of imprisonment is to incapacitate.  Then it will be 
desirable to keep someone imprisoned as long as the reduction in criminal harm from 
incapacitating him exceeds the cost of imprisonment (Shavell, 1987c).  Although this condition 
could hold for a long period, it often will not because the proclivity to commit crimes appears to 
decline sharply with age. 
As a matter of economic logic, the incapacitation rationale might imply that a person 
should be imprisoned even if he has not committed a crime, because the danger he poses to 
society makes incapacitating him worthwhile.  In practice, however, the commission of a 
harmful act may be a good basis for predicting a person’s future behavior, in which case the 
incapacitation rationale would suggest imprisoning an individual only if he has committed such 
an act. 
Two observations are worth noting about the relationship between the incapacitation goal 
and the deterrence goal.  First, when enforcement is based on incapacitation, the optimal 
magnitude of the sanction is independent of the probability of apprehension, which contrasts 
with the case when enforcement is based on deterrence.  Second, when enforcement is 
deterrence-oriented, the probability and magnitude of sanctions depend on the ability to deter, 
and if this ability is limited (as, for instance, with the insane), a low expected sanction may be 
optimal, whereas a high sanction still might be called for to incapacitate.  
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CORRUPTION.  One form of corruption in the enforcement process is bribery, in which 
an enforcer accepts a payment in return for not reporting a violation (or for reducing the 
mandated sanction for the violation).  A second form of corruption is framing and framing-
related extortion, in which an enforcement agent may frame an innocent individual or threaten to 
frame him in order to extort money from him.  On corruption of law enforcement, see Bowles 
and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) (and on corruption more generally, see, for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, and Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
  Bribery dilutes deterrence of violations of law because it results in a lower payment by an 
individual than the sanction for the offense.  Framing and framing-related extortion also dilute 
deterrence.  The reason is that framing and extortion imply that those who act innocently face an 
expected sanction, so that the difference between the expected sanction if an individual commits 
a violation and if he does not is lessened.  (This point is essentially the same as the earlier 
observation that mistaken convictions dilute deterrence.) 
  One way to reduce corruption is to impose fines (or imprisonment sentences) on 
individuals caught engaging in bribery, extortion, and framing.  Corruption also can be reduced 
by paying enforcers rewards for reporting violations.  Such payments will reduce their incentive 
to accept bribes because they will sacrifice their rewards if they fail to report violations.  But 
high rewards give enforcers a greater incentive to frame innocent individuals.  A third way to 
control corruption is to pay enforcers more than their reservation wage (that is, to pay them an 
efficiency wage).  Then they would have more to lose if punished for corrupt behavior and 
denied future employment. 
A natural question is whether the deterrence-diluting effects of corruption can be offset 
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to raise the fine because the optimal fine is maximal.  More realistically, however, the optimal 
fine is less than maximal for a variety of reasons, including those related to risk aversion, 
marginal deterrence, and general enforcement.  While it would then be possible to raise the fine 
to offset the deterrence-diluting effects of corruption, doing so would lead to social costs (for 
example, by imposing greater risk).  
 
COSTLY OBSERVATION OF WEALTH.  Individuals and firms may be able to hide 
assets from government enforcers, including by hoarding cash, transferring assets to relatives or 
related legal entities, or moving money to offshore bank accounts. Consequently, an individual’s 
level of wealth might not be able to be observed at all, or only after a costly audit. 
Suppose first that the enforcement authority employs fines as sanctions and can audit an 
individual who claims that he cannot pay the fine (Polinsky, 2004).  The optimal fine for 
misrepresenting one’s wealth level equals the fine for the offense divided by the audit 
probability, and therefore generally exceeds the fine for the offense.  This is a natural 
generalization of the formula for the optimal fine when the probability of detection is fixed, 
which is the harm divided by the probability.  Auditing is valuable because it reduces 
misrepresentation of wealth and thereby increases deterrence. 
Next suppose that the enforcement authority cannot observe wealth because the cost of 
an audit is prohibitively high (Levitt, 1997; Polinsky, 2006).  If the authority would have used 
fines alone if it could have observed wealth at no cost, it would have imposed a higher fine on 
higher-wealth individuals.  It obviously cannot do this when wealth is unobservable.  Instead, it 
may be desirable to use the threat of an imprisonment sentence to induce individuals capable of 
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fines and imprisonment if it could have observed wealth at no cost.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
inability to observe wealth might not be detrimental in this case.  The reason is that the mix of 
fines and imprisonment that would be chosen when wealth is observable might impose a higher 
burden (though a lower fine) on low-wealth individuals.  Then, high-wealth individuals will 
naturally want to identify themselves.  Specifically, they will prefer to pay a higher fine and bear 
a shorter imprisonment sentence than to masquerade as low-wealth individuals, who will bear 
longer imprisonment sentences and a higher overall burden. 
  
SOCIAL NORMS.  To some extent, social norms and morality are substitutes for public 
law enforcement because they encourage in significant ways the attainment of desired behavior 
(McAdams and Rasmusen, 2007; Posner, 1997; and Shavell, 2002).  Social norms influence 
behavior partly through internal incentives: when a person obeys a moral rule, he will tend to 
feel virtuous, and if he disobeys the rule, he will tend to feel guilty.  Social norms also affect 
behavior through external incentives: when a person is observed by another party to have obeyed 
a moral rule, that party may bestow praise on the first party, who will enjoy the praise; and if the 
person is observed by the other party to have disobeyed the rule, the second party will tend to 
disapprove of the first party, who will dislike the disapproval. 
 Because social norms channel 
behavior in this way, some socially desirable conduct can be encouraged reasonably well without 
employing the legal system.  
Notwithstanding these observations, there will, of course, often be a need for formal law 
enforcement.  First, much conduct that society desires cannot be controlled through moral 
incentives alone.  One reason is that the private gains from undesirable conduct are often large 
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imposed only with a low probability (the robber, tax cheat, or polluter might not be spotted by 
others).  A second rationale for formal law enforcement is that the social harm from failing to 
control an act through moral incentives may be large.  This makes the expense of law 
enforcement worth incurring (as in the case of controlling robbery, but not of cutting in line at 
movie theaters). 
 
FAIRNESS.  To this point we have not considered the possibility that individuals have 
opinions about the fairness of sanctions or the arbitrariness of enforcement (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 2000b;  Kaplow and Shavell, 2002).  Suppose, first, that individuals believe that the 
magnitude of sanctions should reflect the gravity of the acts.  As discussed previously, if 
individuals are risk neutral, the usual solution to the enforcement problem consists of the highest 
possible sanction and a relatively low probability of detection.  When the issue of fairness is 
added to the analysis, however, the usual solution generally is not optimal because a very high 
sanction will be seen as unfair.   
A consequence of the desire to keep sanctions at fair levels, meaning at quite constrained 
levels for acts that are not very harmful, is that the socially optimal probability of detection 
changes.  The optimal probability could be higher than the conventionally optimal probability: to 
achieve a desired level of deterrence with a lower fairness-restricted sanction, the probability has 
to rise, perhaps significantly.  Alternatively, the optimal probability could be lower than in the 
conventional case: the additional deterrence from raising the probability might be relatively low 
because the sanction is relatively low; and the lower the deterrent benefit from raising the 
probability, the lower would be the social incentive to devote resources to enforcement. 
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of sanctions.  Suppose that individuals consider it unfair for some lawbreakers to be sanctioned 
when others, who were lucky enough not to be caught, are not sanctioned.  Then the optimal 
probability would be higher, and therefore the optimal sanction would be lower, than in the 
absence of this fairness concern. 
  A further notion of fairness involves the form of liability, whether liability is strict or 
based on fault.  Individuals might prefer fault-based liability because sanctions are imposed on 
parties only if they behaved in a socially inappropriate way. 
  A final issue concerns the relevance of fairness considerations when firms, as opposed to 
individuals, are sanctioned.  If what matters in terms of fairness is that the individuals 
responsible for harmful acts bear sanctions, as opposed to the artificial legal entity of a firm, one 
would want to identify the sanctions actually suffered by such persons within a firm if the firm 
bears a sanction.  Note, too, that the imposition of sanctions on firms often penalizes individuals 
who are unlikely to be considered responsible for the harm, namely shareholders and customers. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW.  The subject of criminal law may be viewed in the light of the theory 
of public law enforcement (Posner, 1985; Shavell, 1985).  First, the fact that the acts in the core 
area of crime (robbery, murder, rape, and so forth) are punished by the sanction of imprisonment 
makes basic sense.  Were society to rely on fines alone, deterrence of the acts in question would 
be grossly inadequate.  This is because the probability of detecting many of these acts is low, 
making the money sanction necessary for deterrence high, but the assets of individuals who 
commit these acts often are insubstantial.  Hence, the threat of prison is needed for deterrence.  
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deterring individuals who are prone to commit criminal acts. 
Second, many of the doctrines of criminal law appear to enhance social welfare.  This 
seems true of the basic feature of criminal law that punishment is not imposed on all harmful 
acts, but instead is usually confined to those that are especially undesirable.  (For example, 
murder is subject to criminal sanctions, but some accidental killing is not.)  As we have stressed, 
when the socially costly sanction of imprisonment is employed, the fault system is desirable 
because it results in less frequent imposition of punishment than strict liability.  Also, the focus 
on intent in criminal law as a precondition for imposing sanctions may serve to foster deterrence 
because those who intend to do harm are more likely to conceal their acts, and may be harder to 
discourage because of the benefits they anticipate.  An additional example of a welfare-
enhancing doctrine in criminal law concerns attempts.  That attempts to do harm are punished is 
an implicit way of raising the likelihood of sanctions for undesirable acts.  
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